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NUMBERS AND ROSTERS OF THE
TWO ARMIES IN THE CIVIL WAR

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The Numbers and Rosters of the Two Armies in the Civil War

BY GEN. GATES P. THRUSTON
OF NASHVILLE, TENN.

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(*This article reprinted from The Olympian Magazine*)

In this new era of universal devotion to the interests of our country, I am reluctant to revive the controversies of the past or to recall the victories or defeats of the Civil War. There is a subject, however, that has not received the attention from our military critics and writers at the North or South which its importance merits. I shall take the liberty, therefore, of considering briefly *The Numbers and Rosters of the two Armies in the Civil War.*

The veterans of the Civil War, Federal and Confederate, are commending our able Secretary of War for his efforts to obtain the names, numbers, and full enrollment of the soldiers of the Confederacy. These records are necessary to complete the official history of the war, and to give just recognition to the American soldiers of the South.

We have had very meager and indefinite figures by which to compare the number of enlistments and the magnitude of the two armies, Federal and Confederate, in the great conflict. Unfavorable comparisons and contrasts are frequently suggested as to the number of soldiers engaged upon each side, but I believe when the official rolls and figures are placed on the same basis and finally reported and compared, there will be no room for contrasting criticism as to the magnitude of the two armies, or as to the courage, the prowess, or generalship of the American soldiers from the North or the South.

Fortunately the names and full enrollment of the union forces are complete. The official figures, embracing the entire rolls, the enlistments and reenlistments for long and short terms of service, the one hundred days' men, three months' men, the ninety days' men, the veteran reserve, the home guards, the colored troops, amount to the large aggregate enrollment of 2,778,304 men. This large total reduced to the basis of a full term enlistment for the war would probably cut down the aggregate number to about 1,700,000 men.

The absence of systematic records of the Confederate forces, the loss or destruction of official papers, during the evacuation of Richmond, and during the chaos of the reconstruction period, has left no definite summary nor figures by which the total enrollment of the armies and detached forces of the Confederacy can be accurately estimated.

In 1869, soon after the Civil War, and during the era of prejudice that naturally succeeded, Dr. Joseph Jones, an ex-Confederate surgeon, Secretary of the Southern Historical Society at New Orleans, prepared a paper upon the "Confederate Losses During the War." In this paper he stated that "the available Confederate force, ca-

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pable of active service in the field, did not during the entire war exceed six hundred thousand men." I quote from his brief paper It contains no statistics nor special grounds for his estimate of the number of forces. Dr. Jones states that his "calculation is given only as an approximation."

The official papers of the Confederate War Department, including the incomplete army rolls, had been captured at the close of the war, and were stored in the War Department at Washington, and, therefore, I do not think Dr. Jones' estimate from memory or unofficial data can be relied upon as accurate. "Available force" is a very indefinite and confusing term. We would usually interpret it as the efficient field force or fighting strength of an army. It does not generally constitute more than about sixty or sixty-five per cent. of the full army enrollment. There may have been a million enlistments on the original Confederate rolls, during the four years of the war, including re-enlistments and transfers, and men on post or detached and temporary duty, or home guards, veteran or invalid soldiers guarding forts, or enlisted deserters (who are counted on the Federal rolls), and yet out of this whole number, the available force capable of active service in the field may not have been over 600,000 soldiers. The average effective strength of the Federal army during the Civil War was sixty-five per cent. of its enrollment. In the same proportion "an available force" of 600,000 Confederates would represent on enrollment of nearly a million men, or to be exact, 923,076.

Dr. Jones' "approximate" estimate was published in the Southern Historical Society papers, and later his figures were republished in various forms throughout the South. Unfortunately his statement that the "available force in the field, capable of active service amounted to 600,000 men" was quoted and requoted from time to time, until, by some process of evolution, it was later regarded as an official statement of the entire enlisted forces of the Southern Army of all classes and duties, and it is now quite generally accepted at the South as the aggregate of the enrolled forces of the Confederacy.

Dr. Jones' 600,000 estimate is engraved upon enduring monuments in the South, commemorating the Confederacy, in contrast with the engraved figures of the large official Federal enrollment. The contrasting figures are printed upon the certificates of membership in the Confederate societies. The Southern orators usually repeat the contrasting numbers at meetings and dedications in honor of the Confederate soldier. They are printed in the Southern school books, and thus a misleading historical error in figures, as I believe, originally possibly a just "approximate calculation" of the available force of the Confederacy, has been repeated, until its original significance and meaning have been changed and forgotten; and this mainly from lack of the full Confederate rolls and of definite information upon the subject, and usually with no intention to misrepresent the facts.

It was not the special duty of any Southern Governor, or Confederate veteran, to worry through the haystack of Confederate army rolls to find the exact number of the total enlistments. The majority of the Southern veterans are too busy with the earnest things of life to bother with the statistics of the Civil War, and the camp fire or bivouac regulars who, after the manner of our Northern Grand Army posts, usually administer upon the military

affairs of the Confederacy at the South, were quite content with Dr. Jones' estimate of 600,000. Why should they not be? It is certainly small enough!

The main material is in the War Department at Washington. The carpet-baggers had also camped in several of the Southern capitol buildings, and perhaps had lighted their pipes and kindled the fires with the army rolls. Occasionally some thoughtful Confederate has urged in the Southern papers that the accepted estimate of Confederate forces was much too small, but the protests have made very little impression. No salary was waiting for the industrious historical pioneer who might investigate and work up a reliable summary of the rolls. It was in fact a convenient temptation to accept Dr. Jones' "approximate calculation" as the true history and number of the entire enrollment. Dr. Jones was a most excellent gentleman and an accomplished physician. I knew him personally. Six hundred thousand in round numbers sounded well. The very figures suggested the immortal six hundred of Balaklava. They were enshrined in poetry and printed in eloquent prose, and thus those ancient figures of Dr. Jones and this chronic and misleading historical error, as I believe it to be, have drifted down to our time without serious investigation or contradiction, and as I have stated, mainly from lack of exact and definite information, and usually with no intention to misrepresent the facts.

I desire to present a brief analysis of the figures representing the enrollments and actual strength of the two armies, Confederate and Federal, in the Civil War, and some reflections regarding them, with the view of correcting, to some extent, at least, this widely spread misapprehension as to the 600,000 estimate, and to give a more just impression of the actual fighting strength upon each side. I trust I may be able to discuss the subject impartially and without partisan spirit. The truth, I am sure, will leave no grounds for unfavorable comment or comparison, as to the military record upon either side.

The time has come when the veterans of both armies desire to know the truth, the whole truth, unbiased by sentiment or prejudice. The sincere purposes, the patriotic aspirations, and the honorable and indeed brilliant record of the Confederate soldier have long since been crystallized into history, and no presentation of the facts can detract from the laurels he has won. His enduring courage and manhood through the years of the great conflict stand clear above the collapse at Appomattox and have survived after the war in a citizenship of which any nation might be proud. His sons shared with our sons the new honors of the Spanish War in loyal devotion to our united country. The heroism of the American soldiers on both sides of the great struggle will continue to challenge the admiration of the student of history as long as the story is told.

We shall not be able to know the total enrollment of the soldiers of the Confederacy until Secretary Root's investigations are completed, and the final reports are received from the Southern States (and it may be years before final and satisfactory results are reached), but for some time past we have had approximate information and figures that I think readily establish the fact that the estimate of an "available force of 600,000 soldiers" does not represent much more than half of the enlistments, and re-

enlistments, and transfers, and enrollments of Confederate soldiers during the four years of the war, which must have aggregated in numbers at least a million men.

It is, therefore, manifestly unjust to set up in contrasting figures the full official Federal enlistment on the one side, and the "available force in the field" estimate of 1869, on the other side, as history or true history. They represent two entirely different standards of estimation that are confusing.

This method of calculation and criticism is a relic of the war and of the days when we were all partisans. It is one of the myths of that unhappy era that has outlived its day and generation. If practical and useful results are to be reached, the two full enrollments, or rosters of enlistments, Federal and Confederate, should be placed upon the same basis and compared and contrasted, and I am satisfied that neither side will suffer by this just method of comparison.

Upon making some investigation as to the approximate numbers of the Confederate enrollment, I find that the State of North Carolina some time since printed the rolls of its Confederate soldiers, aggregating about 125,000 men. A more recent summary increases the number to 127,000. The State of Tennessee has long claimed and fairly established the fact that she sent 115,000 soldiers into the Southern armies, besides her contribution to the Union forces. At the dedication of the battlefield of Chickamauga, Governor Oates, of the State of Alabama, in his admirable address, reported that Alabama had furnished 100,000 soldiers to the Confederacy, a larger proportion than I have assigned to Tennessee. Mississippi by a quite generally accepted computation furnished 85,000.

By these estimates the enlistments or enrollments of these four States aggregate 427,000 soldiers. Virginia, according to the official reports, sent twelve or fourteen more regiments into the war than North Carolina, or their equivalent in battalions and companies, and the State of Georgia a number of regiments more. A proportionate increase in the enlistments in Virginia and Georgia would credit Virginia with an enrollment of about 150,000, and Georgia with about 125,000 or 130,000.

These six of the eleven seceding States, by this estimate, seem to have furnished over 700,000 Confederate soldiers, or enlistments to that number. The remaining five seceding States, including the large States of Texas, Louisiana, and Arkansas, according to the census of 1860-61, giving the number of men of military age in them, should have furnished over 300,000 soldiers, computing numbers in the same proportion. Add these numbers to the 700,000 and you have an approximate aggregate of over a million men, not counting the large number of soldiers (probably 100,000) furnished by the border States to the Confederacy.

Suppose we try another method of calculation. On the base of the imposing and beautiful Confederate monument erected at Austin, the capital city of Texas, the Confederate and Federal enlistments are engraved as follows:

"Number of men enlisted—Confederate Armies, 700,000; Federal Armies, 2,859,132."

An increase of nearly 100,000 over the official Federal figures, and also of 100,000 over the usual Confederate estimates. Again, and below the above inscription on the same monument:

"Losses from all causes—Confederate, 437,000; Federal, 485,216."

It will be observed that there is manifestly an error upon the face of this enduring record, presuming death losses may be intended. It seems impossible that there should be a loss of 437,000 Confederate soldiers out of so small an enlistment as 700,000, or a loss of over four-sevenths of the entire enrolled forces of the Confederacy. Upon the examination of the census of 1890, twenty-five years after the Civil War, I find that at that time, there were still living in the United States 432,020 Confederate soldiers, leaving out of the account the number of deaths that occurred during this long interval.

Now, if we should add to the number of surviving Confederate soldiers in 1890 the number of deaths during the war, as registered on the Texas monument, we have an aggregate of nearly 900,000 Confederates. Add to this number the deaths during the interval of twenty-five years, according to the approved American tables of death rates, 144,000, and we will have over a million soldiers or enlistments.

Again, referring to the official census of 1890. If there were then surviving 432,000 Confederate soldiers, the American life tables show that at the close of the war in 1865 there must have been 600,000 surviving Confederate soldiers, after all the losses of the war are deducted. (According to the life tables the numbers would be about 575,000, but the veterans of the war, owing to their disabilities, would show a slightly increased death rate, bringing the numbers up to at least 600,000.) How much more accurate are the official figures of the census than the "approximate estimates" and misleading guesses of the local historians, sometimes so sensitive lest errors might creep into the historical records.

Let us take a third illustration. According to the census of 1860 the eleven seceding States (omitting Missouri and Kentucky) had more than a million white men eligible to military duty—that is, between the ages of eighteen and forty-five; and, as General Grant is said to have aptly remarked, during the war the Confederate authorities "robbed the cradle and the grave" for soldiers between the ages of seventeen and fifty years or over, in their struggle to maintain the strength of their armies! Thus increasing the number of available men to about 1,200,000. Owing to the South's large agricultural slave population, she was able to send to her armies, or to some class of military service, almost her entire white male population. Over 200,000 youths in these States arrived at the military age during the four years of the war. With this large number of available soldiers at her command, does it seem just, or complimentary, to the seceding States, to insist that only one-half of their white military population was willing to enlist in the Southern cause?

Is it not more of a compliment to the courage and patriotism of these States to recognize the fact, so often claimed by them, that nearly their entire white male population, including young and old, capable of bearing arms, arose to resist what the South then regarded as invasion and coercion, rather than attempt to limit their total enlistments and re-enlistments to the small number of six or seven hundred thousand, about one-half of their available military population, omitting the large number of recruits from the border States, which much more than equaled the Federal enlistments in the seceding States.

The State of Ohio, with a population in 1860 of about one-third of the population of the seceding States, according to her official reports, enlisted over 313,000 soldiers for long and short terms to maintain the integrity of the Union. According to the census Indiana sent over seventy-four per cent. of her men of military age into the war. Can the eleven seceding States afford to admit that Ohio and Indiana were more patriotic than the South, and that their sons, enlisted in much larger proportion than the men of the South, who were resisting the (so-called) invasion of their homes and firesides? I think not.

The theory of the total enrollment of only 600,000 or 700,000 men certainly does injustice to the South. It minimizes its patriotism. It does injustice to the North in presenting a contrast of figures that has no real basis of fact. Can the South afford to exalt and idealize the courage of a limited number of its soldiers at the expense of its patriotism or what it regarded as loyalty to the secession cause? If there were only 600,000 patriots on the army rolls, there must have been 300,000 or 400,000 unpatriotic shirks hiding out in the woods somewhere. The theory of small numbers cuts both ways. It places the South in a dilemma. It reminds me of the story of the old Federal at the North, who talked so much at the family fireside about how he had fought and how many rebels he had killed in the war, that one day his little son said to him, "I say, Pa, did anybody help you put down the Rebellion?"

When the Confederate rolls are finally summarized I think it will be found that there were other Southern patriots who took a hand in the big war besides the alleged 600,000.

Mr. Blaine in his "Political History" states that the armies of the South numbered about 1,100,000 men. When the rosters of the regiments and detached forces of the Confederacy are complete, as called for by the Secretary of War, I think the aggregate will nearly reach Mr. Blaine's calculation. General Ainsworth, of the War Department, has recently estimated their strength at about a million men, and Senator Daniel, of Virginia, at 800,000.

I have lived in the South nearly forty years. My ancestry is mainly Southern, and I feel that I have a right to discuss this subject as a Southerner, as well as from the standpoint of an *ex-Federal soldier*. I have perhaps become sensitive as to this contrast of figures, but to my mind it gives so misleading an impression that it should not be perpetuated and allowed to go down as history to the new generations, North and South. The figures 2,700.000 or 2,800,000 and 600,000 have a kind of five to one flavor and significance quite out of harmony with the Federal army ideas of history. They, in fact, suggest the arithmetical proportions of that old ante-bellum myth, or fiction, held by an occasional radical or hot blood of the South, "befo' the wah" that one Southerner could take care of about five Yankees, a very misleading dogma as it turned out.

The figures remind me of an incident of the unhappy and demoralizing days of reconstruction: Judge Rice, a prominent and well-known politician of Alabama, who had been a Democrat and a Confederate soldier, undertook to change front and run for Congress upon the Republican ticket. When he delivered his first campaign speech his old Democratic friends began to guy him with questions:

"Say, Jedge, didn't you urge our young men to jine the Southern army? Didn't you say one Southerner could whip five Yankees?" "Well, perhaps I did," the judge replied. "Didn't you say right here in Huntsville that we could whip the damn Yankees with pop guns?" "Yes, I did," the judge said, "but damn it, the Yankees wouldn't fight us with pop guns. They wouldn't fight us that way. The rascals came at us with powder and shot —circumstances changed."

I have rarely met a Southerner who claimed to be a "five to one hero" during my residence at the South. I think the species has long since become extinct. We are all more or less influenced by our environment. I have had some things to learn at the South and some to unlearn. My convictions as to the war, I may say, have stuck pretty close by me, but I would be recreant to the truth, to my home, and to my friends at the South, if I had anything but kindness and compliments to report as to them. The veterans of the Southern army are among my best friends. They are the South's best citizens—the peers of the best type of gentlemen to be found in any country, liberal, generous in sentiment and free from partisanship. They are looking to the present and the future, not complaining as to the past. The friendships, the mutual consideration and regard of the soldiers at the South, Confederate and Federal, have been an important factor in allaying our political antagonism and reviving the spirit of nationality throughout the South. No section of our great republic has today more interest or pride in its unity and its destiny than the South.

Turning to my subject again, and to the large official Federal enrollment, we find that the number of soldiers credited to the national armies usually gives a misleading impression, owing to the very completeness of the official record. The large aggregate of 2,778,000 in round numbers must be carefully analyzed and sifted to give a just estimate of the available force, or of the fighting strength of the Union armies. These figures include the entire enrollments or enlistments of all classes, single, double and treble during the four years of the war.

As I have stated, they include all local and temporary enlistments. For instance: The First Ohio Infantry, with which I entered the service, enlisted three times. First in 1861 "for three months," again in 1861 "for three years," and in 1864 "till the end of the war." Thus this large regiment is counted three times in the general enlistment. One hundred and thirty-six regiments enlisted two or three times during the war, and are counted two or three times on the rolls. Three hundred regiments entered upon the rolls served upon the border or in the rear, and never got into action or saw a battle. Nearly 400,000 enlistments were for one year; 88,000 for nine months; 108,000 for three months, and over 86,000 for one hundred days. Nearly 300,000 of the men enrolled enlisted just before the close of the war, too late to participate in its active campaigns or engagements. One hundred and eighty-six thousand enlistments of colored troops were carried upon the rolls. Owing to various causes the names of the same soldiers often appear upon the general roll four or fives times. Every transfer added a new name to the roll. These illustrations enable us to realize how misleading are the large figures and numbers usually credited to the national armies. They give an exaggerated impression of the actual forces. If every

enlistment, re-enlistment and transfer of soldiers made in the Southern armies during the four years of war was counted upon their rolls, it would certainly nearly double any estimate of their available force in the field.

Mr. Fox, who has published the most complete statistics of the Federal forces in the Civil War, states that "it is doubtful if there were two million individuals actually in service during the war," on the Federal side—that is, for all long and short terms of service.

The official report of the Provost Marshal General shows the combined strength of the Federal armies at different periods during the war (deducting absentees) in round numbers as follows:

On July 1, 1861, the combined armies numbered 183,000.
January 1, 1862, the combined armies numbered 527,000.
January 1, 1863, the combined armies numbered 698,000.
January 1, 1864, the combined armies numbered 611,000.
March 31, 1865, the combined armies numbered 657,000.

This was "the available force capable of active service in the field," to use Dr. Jones' expression regarding the Confederate forces; more than half of them were practically rear guards. As you see, the numbers do not run up into the millions. They include the entire Union forces, at the front, in the rear, in reserve, guarding cities, bridges, railways, block houses and stores. The front of the army line extended from the Atlantic Ocean to the Rocky Mountains.

The armies of the Confederacy were of necessity much less in numbers. They had probably not one-half the strength of the forces engaged upon the Federal side, perhaps less, much less than one-half, but at the front at the points of actual contact and conflict, in the great battles, owing to their interior lines, railways, and defensive advantages, the South as we know full well, was able to bring equal or nearly equal forces into action.

The stupendous and appalling task that confronted the armies of the Union required a vastly superior force; a task that might well have caused the patriotic people of the North and border States to hesitate in dismay. An army of invasion and aggression, under the conditions of modern warfare, has to meet and overcome tremendous odds, as compared with the demands upon an army of defense. This general rule as to offensive and defensive warfare has been well recognized ever since the time when Leonidas and his little band of Spartans held back the hosts of the Persian army in the narrow pass of Thermopylae.

In the American Revolution, our small Colonial forces—

"The Old Continentals,
With their ragged regimentals"—

held the disciplined armies of England at bay for six or seven years. When the British ventured to leave their ships and the cities of the Atlantic Coast, and march into the interior, their campaigns of invasion soon ended at Saratoga, King's Mountain, and Yorktown. General Andrew Jackson, with a handful of Tennesseeans and Kentuckians, occupying a strong defensive position below New Orleans, in a single battle well nigh destroyed Packingham's large army of British veterans.

The difficulties of an army of invasion were remarkably illustrated in the recent war in South Africa. Superiority in numbers to the extent of ten or twenty, or even thirty to one, did not seem to bring success to Brit-

ish arms. Great Britain sent over 445,000 soldiers, according to recent official reports, to fight an armed force of perhaps 30,000 or 40,000 Boers. We know the English, Scotch Highlanders, the Irish, the Canadians and Australians made good soldiers. The resources of the British were apparently without limit, yet this "wretched little population of Boers," as Lord Salisbury calls them, defied the power and prowess of the whole British empire for two or three years, and the final result was only humiliation and partial success.

Our friends, General John Morgan and General Basil Duke, undertook a little byplay in the way of a campaign of invasion north of the Ohio River. They were as gallant and dashing a pair of soldiers as ever led a charge. They struck terror into the hearts of the home guards for a time, but their campaign soon degenerated into a kind of cavalry stampede, that was finally rounded up at Columbus, Ohio.

When Robert E. Lee, the great and lovable General of the Confederacy, crossed Mason and Dixon's line, and marshaled his splendid army upon the hills near Gettysburg, only a few miles north of Maryland, how rapidly his difficulties multiplied. The Army of the Potomac had but recently suffered repeated disasters upon Virginia soil. General Meade had been in command only three days, but when his army became an army of defense, upon the loyal hills of Pennsylvania, General Lee's army of invasion was soon compelled to retire behind the protecting line of the Potomac River.

Ah! the love of home is an inspiring sentiment. It gets close to the heart. It nerves the arm of the defenders to strike hard—

> "For our altars and our fires,
> God and our native land."

If an army of invasion (so called) from the South could have fought its way northward, and threatened or attacked the cities and homes of New England or Michigan, they would have struck the same desperate courage with which the South met that so-called army of invasion from the North at Shiloh and Atlanta. General Lee had to meet this new spirit of defense when he crossed the line and ventured to invade the North.

These illustrations show how impossible it is to measure the honors or to fix the standard of courage or manhood on either side of a great conflict like our Civil War. The disproportion in numbers lays no foundation for unfavorable comparison or contrasting criticism. There are other controlling factors that must be taken into account, if the question of superiority is to be considered, or a judicial decision reached as to which were the best types of physical prowess and manhood in the Civil War.

The territory of the seceding States (omitting Missouri and Kentucky), comprised over 800,000 square miles, an area as great, or greater, than the combined territory of Great Britain (including Ireland), France, Germany and Italy. It had a white population of five or six million Americans of almost pure Anglo-Saxon strain. It is the land of the Scotch-Irish men, the Puritans of the South, tough in fiber of brain and body, the land of the descendants of the old-time Virginia aristocracy, of the South Carolina Hotspurs, a class of Americans born and bred to rule or fight. Great distances had to be fought over, high mountains scaled, deep rivers crossed, vast stores transported, and the whole area in the rear defended. What greater example of courage and manhood has history, ancient or modern,

furnished than was shown by our national armies in marching five hundred miles down into the heart of the Confederacy, scaling the high mountains, crossing the deep rivers, pushing through forest and field into the territory of six million Americans of our own blood, the home of more than a million Confederate soldiers, and what is more, staying there, winning great victories there, and finally maintaining and restoring the supreme authority of the National Government over this vast Southern section and population. There is no rule of numbers that can measure such success. The very achievement defies comparison or criticism.

When our beloved and great-hearted President, Abraham Lincoln, stated that he was proud to belong to the same race as the Southern soldiers who marched with General Pickett up the slopes of Cemetery Hill, at Gettysburg, he paid a beautiful and well-merited tribute to the almost matchless soldiers of General Lee, but what veteran of the armies of the Cumberland was not reminded by the remark that the slopes of Mission Ridge at Chattanooga were even steeper than the famed heights of Gettysburg? In the cruel drama of war, what more splendid example of enduring courage does history recall than was shown when Rosecrans' army changed front and stayed the storm of disaster at Murfreesboro, turning defeat into victory; or when glorious old "Pap Thomas," with half our army of the Cumberland, held at bay from noon till night the entire army of Bragg and Longstreet, far off upon the hills of Northern Georgia, at Chickamauga, nearly four hundred miles south of our base of supplies?

No, my comrades, there is no standard by which we can compare the soldiers of the North and the soldiers of the South in the great war that does not reflect honor upon both. It was a war between Americans, Anglo-Saxons in the main, of the same general ancestry and of the same inherited characteristics.

The best lesson of the Civil War, and one that every section of our great Republic should remember, teaches us that there are no geographical limits to American manhood. It can not be sectionalized. All opinions to the contrary must be regarded as the offspring of mere partisanship and provincialism. They do not rise to the true standard of the broad spirit of Americanism. As one of our distinguished Confederates, ex-Governor Porter, of Tennessee, stated at the dedication of our Tennessee monuments, Confederate and Federal, at Chickamauga, "If the combatants had not already learned it, they learned it upon this field, that educated Americans, of every section of the American Union, were alike brave in action, and that advantages won by either resulted from the character of their leadership."

In the conflicts and struggles between the Puritan and the Cavalier and their descendants, many victories have been won and lost, but the question as to "Who is the master" is still unsettled.

In the words of the poet of Scotland there are—

"Hills beyond Pentland and lands beyond Forth,
Be the Lords in the Lowlands, there are chiefs in the North."

As Admiral Schley said of Santiago, "There's glory enough to go round." Yes; and to spare. We are proud to have him as our guest tonight. Every true soldier honors the grand Admiral for his generous sentiment.

We won the honors of success in the Civil War, and we know full well that we shall never have a share in any other duty or achievement so useful, so honorable, or so memorable; but the Federal soldier must be cold and ungenerous indeed, whether his home be at the North or South, if he fails to pay the tribute of respect and admiration to the soldiers of the Confederacy, who matched deeds with us through four long years, who with a narrower and mistaken loyalty, as we think, but with like sincerity, courage and devotion, and under greater trials and sacrifices, fought a losing fight, clear through to the bitter end of the great tragedy; who lost all save the jewel of an honorable record, and yet, with enduring manhood arose from defeat, and with equal courage and devotion turned their bronzed faces to the future, a future full of golden promise, and set about to build up anew and recreate their homes and country.

And have they not, they and their sons and daughters, amid constant trials and embarrassments, recreated and rebuilt the South and brought that promise into fruition? Has not the South arisen from the ashes of war and waste into a splendid prosperity? Activities and energies, born of necessity and poverty have stimulated every avenue of commerce and developed her latent forces, until the South of today is rivaling the industrial and commercial prosperity of the North. Neither tradition nor partisanship can stay her progress.

The New South has no interest apart from her sisters of the North and West, and what is more, she is inspired with the same spirit of nationality and loyalty to every interest that affects our common country. Her patriotism is as broad as the Republic.

The Confederate Armies.

To the Editor of the Olympian:

In an article or address published in the last number of the *Olympian*, upon the "Numbers and Rosters of the Two Armies in the Civil War," I endeavored to show that the Confederate armies were much larger than the estimate generally accepted at the South, and that instead of having but 600,000 soldiers upon the rolls during the four years of the Civil War, they had from 1,000,000 to 1,100,000 soldiers. I presented three methods of calculation reaching practically the same result, in support of my views, as to these numbers.

Since your November number was issued, my attention has been called to a Confederate official report, made to the Confederate War Department in January, 1864, that gives more direct and definite information upon this subject than I was able to present in the November publication.

In Serial No. 129, page 95, of the official records of the Union and Confederate Armies, in the War Department at Washington, there is an official report of Lieutenant-Colonel Blake, "Superintendent of Special Registration," made to the Bureau of Conscription of the Confederate War Department, at Richmond, Va., in January, 1864.

The report contains a detailed statement of the number of troops furnished to the Confederate armies by the six States in his department of

duty, to wit: The States of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi. It gives the number of volunteers and conscripts, and the number of exemptions owing to physical disabilities, in each of these States, and points out methods by which the Confederate forces can be increased.

In his final summary, Lieutenant-Colonel Blake reports that these six States in his department had furnished 566,456 soldiers to the Confederate armies up to January 1, 1864.

If the remaining five Confederate States, including Tennessee, furnished soldiers to the Confederate armies in like proportion (according to the census of their military population in 1860-1861), they must have furnished 416,176 soldiers.

By this just method of calculation, we are able to show, approximately, that the eleven Confederate States sent to the armies of the Confederacy, up to January 1, 1864, 982,632 men. The enlistments and conscripts during the last fifteen months of the war must have increased this number to much more than a million men.

Add to this number the recruits obtained from the border States (from 90,000 to 100,000 men), and you have about 1,100,000 soldiers, thus reaching practically the same result we arrived at by the three methods of calculation presented in my article in your last issue. G. P. T.

Statistics of Soldiers in Both Armies.*

By Gen. Gates P. Thruston (U. S. A.), Nashville, Tenn.

I notice in the excellent March number of the *Confederate Veteran* that you reprint from the Baltimore *Sun* Mr. Cassenove G. Lee's ancient Civil War statistics as to the number of soldiers in the armies of the North and South. There is no historical foundation whatever for the statement made by him that the "total enlistments in the Confederate Army" consisted of "six hundred thousand men."

A much more distinguished and reliable Southern authority, Dr. Woodrow Wilson, of Virginia (now president of Princeton College), in his admirable "History of the American People" states the number of Federal and Confederate soldiers in the Civil War as follows: "In the North four men out of every nine of the military population had enlisted for a service of three years in the field—in all, 1,700,000 out of a military population of 4,600,000." (Volume IV, page 267.) And again (page 267) he gives the numbers in the Confederate armies as follows: "The total military population of the South (the seceding States) was but 1,065,000. Nine hundred thousand of these she drew into her armies for at least three years of service, and before the war ended mere half-grown boys and men grown old were included in the muster." The Confederate soldiers in the border States were not included in Dr. Wilson's statement.

In the carefully prepared "History of the United States," by Mr. Waddy Thompson, of Atlanta, Ga., published

* This article reprinted from the *Confederate Veteran.*

in 1904, after its Civil War chapters had been reviewed by that prince of gentlemen and soldier, Gen. John B. Gordon, he states that "it is probable that the total number of enlistments in the Confederate armies was nearly a million." (See preface and page 406.)

I am so fond of the editor of the *Confederate Veteran* and read the magazine with so much pleasure that I am anxious that it shall be historically accurate in its statements.

General Thruston has been studying the statistics of the two armies for years, and there can be no question of his absolute sincerity in seeking to have the truth established; but he has been in the South so long that he must be pardoned for pride in reducing discrepancy of numbers. General Thruston is one of the best citizens in the South, and none the less good for having married twice into families of cultured, ardent Southern people. True, he simply quotes in the foregoing from cordially accepted Southern authors; yet the *Veteran,* while having due esteem for him and them, does not agree to quite so great compromise of the statistics that have been so long accepted. The Union Army reduced from 2,800,000 to 1,700,000 and the Confederate increased from 600,000 to 1,000,000 men is too great a difference. Southern authors should be very careful of their figures. A compromise from both sides as to actual three-year soldiers might be nearer the truth.

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